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ABSTRACT

The nation‟s security strategy tends to be reactionary to a specific event. It is rare
when established policies have proven successful, even though there is substantial
financial and resource investment. The payoff is measured by analyzing the desired
minimal effect rather than prevention of the event altogether. Such is the case in
combating explosives-related threats.
Today, research and development, science and technology, are plugged as the
saviors of a post-blast event. Synthetic and composite materials are used to strengthen
barriers and cutting-edge technology is utilized to refine the latest in standoff detection.
These legitimate measures provide a sense of security for those who are “protected.” By
establishing acceptance that the blast will occur, a facility‟s infrastructure and occupants
fall into a specific category where minimizing is the accepted goal, rather than blast
prevention being the ultimate objective. Although massive walls can act as a deterrent to
terrorist attacks, evil doers are capable of breaching those barriers both from the exterior
and interior. Therefore, a more logical goal of preventing the blast must be emplaced.
Like safety, where the aim is to prevent injury, explosives training must be
implemented to enhance a site‟s capabilities to deter possible attacks. This paper
investigates the current practices in explosives recognition and awareness (ERA) training,
the availability of such training to pertinent security personnel and first responders, the
tactics utilized to mitigate explosives events and develops a comprehensive psychological
training mechanism, site awareness of firing and explosives devices (SAFE-D), on which
both the private and public sector can build an authentic explosives site security plan.
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1. INTRODUCTION

During the past decade, billions of American dollars have been spent to combat
explosives-related threats. The focus of this investment has been, and continues to be, the
funding for better explosives detection technologies and improved barrier systems. Just in
2010 alone an abundance of the nation‟s treasure has gone to fund extraordinary sensor
technology in hopes of easing citizens‟ safety concerns. These investments include $215
million allocated for the 2011 budget for the purchase of body scanners to be utilized at
airports. This initiative was sparked by the alleged high-explosive detonation attempt by
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab aboard an aircraft on Christmas 2009 in which some
officials believe the X-ray device would have revealed the explosive (HSNW, 2010).
Interestingly, this funding is earmarked despite privacy concerns that may eventually
reach the United State Supreme Court. The attempt was foiled by courageous passengers
and poor execution on Abdulmutallab‟s part.
Other recent funding includes over $1 billion for explosives detection systems
allocated from the Transportation Security Administration‟s (TSA) share of the 2009
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and a 2010 budget of over an additional $1.5
billion for purchase and installation of explosive detection systems (HSNW, 2010). These
are substantial investments for equipment that may give false positives or negatives or
simply may not work at all, especially at safe standoff distances. Further, there may be
legitimate concerns other than privacy and cost. Some technologies may use radiation,
may be incompatible with existing screening techniques or may be limited as to what
type of explosive or explosive residue it can detect. Therefore, it is essential that site
security professionals, facility managers and owners and operators consider low-cost,
effective approaches to raise explosives-related threat awareness, and equip their
employees with the knowledge of how to recognize those threats. It is the goal of this
research to investigate current practices of human perception and to develop a
foundational training program on which companies can build a practical and testable site
security plan that addresses explosives-related threats and aids to alleviate complacency.
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1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The concentration on bulk and trace detection sensors and systems at standoff is a
legitimate research venture for mitigating the risk of an explosives event, as is the
manufacturing of superb barrier systems. Like detection systems, many companies, and
vast amounts of financial support, are directed to the development, testing and
improvement of blast resistant barriers. Schools such as Missouri University of Science
and Technology (Missouri S&T), an engineering university located in Rolla, Missouri,
continue to create and test astonishing blast resistant materials. Again, millions of dollars
are invested to perfect the physical protection against substantial improvised explosives
devices (IEDs).
Alternatively, a mindset accepting of the premise that explosives events will occur
must also be subjected to scrutiny. Neither this author, nor any reasonable person, will
logically argue that all events, such as crime, can be prevented. However, the ultimate
goal must be just that. This same philosophy applies to any safety program. For
occupational safety purposes an employer encourages a zero-accident policy although the
occasional smashed finger will occur. The realistic and achievable end state must be that
of risk acceptance and mitigation as discussed in Section 3. But facility managers must
set their aim to the pinnacle of safety and not toward the inevitability of the event. They
must act in the interest of protecting their employees, contractors, visitors and
infrastructure and continue to implement economically viable and practiced procedures to
ensure site safety. The federal government‟s explosives-related threat focus, albeit noble,
should not be the sole protection on which a company relies. Although federal agencies
have enjoyed many successes stopping potential terrorist attacks, they have received their
share of criticism as well. Considering that the United States alone uses billions of
pounds of explosives annually, and in some cases, as discussed in Section 2, those
explosives are accessible to egregious employees, facility managers must develop a
hybrid approach to mitigate the threat. This concentration should not only involve the
best available proven technology, but also a component of explosives education and
training. Throughout this composition, clear parallels will liken ongoing procedures in
varying industrial practices to the creation of SAFE-D.
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Certainly, the focus of this composition is not to discourage the continued
development of bulk and trace detection sensors and systems and blast resistant barriers,
but rather the aim is to investigate the lack of genuine psychological explosives-related
threat training for security forces, first responders, employees, researchers and
contractors. The initial focus for site security, especially at structures like hospitals and
schools, must address the attitude and behavior of those charged with protecting others
and establishing a climate in which explosives and explosives components can be
recognized, an explosives event can be avoided and those assigned with site security are
continuously alert to the explosives-related threat.
1.2. INFORMATION SHARING
In order to properly address the pertinence of explosives-related threat training to a
facility, there first must be an investigation into the current state of information gathering
and sharing. Explosives recognition and awareness (ERA) training, specifically being
able to identify basic components of explosives material and possible detonators, as well
as understanding the common characteristics of high explosives and the result of a
significant blast, must address typical concerns of site managers. The training must:
Establish a common explosives vocabulary
Be continuously improved and tested
Address site specifics and professional roles
Cover the risk management process
Create a basic knowledge of explosives components
Be available and cost effective to obtain
Be incentive-based rather than punitive
Receive participant feedback regarding attitude and behavior.
These criteria are analyzed further in this work.
Historically, training that targets ERA both in the public and private domains has
been protected, expensive or non-existent. Despite the concentration for development of
explosives detection, especially since the September 11th attacks on the United States,
sharing information regarding explosives and explosives-related threats has been a
contested issue. As discussed in Section 2.2, even federal agencies tasked with such
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training tend to draw fire for jurisdictional issues and poor tactics and implementation of
policy when working with other entities. What‟s more, the attacks in 2001, and not so
much the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and 1995 Oklahoma City attack have
created an international stigma regarding explosives. Drastic and immediate measures
such as the Safe Explosives Act (SEA) of 2002 were common results of 9-11 and the
push for better explosives detection technology has been reinforced publically by the
2001 and 2009 attempted attacks by shoe bomber Richard Reid and the aforementioned
Abdulmutallab, respectively. While the attack on the A.P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City didn‟t seem to spawn sudden panic regarding explosives detection, it did
change the way in which the federal government evaluated its own vulnerabilities.
Within two months of the Oklahoma City attack, the Department of Justice
(DOJ), along with several other federal agencies, released its “Vulnerability Assessment
of Federal Facilities.” The report was the initial effort to be undertaken by the General
Services Administration (GSA) to outline physical security measures and construction
regulations of government structures. While its primary focus was that of physical
security, it did spawn several subsequent standards that strengthened total security
measures. The DOJ report also created an awareness that security training must be taken
into consideration as well, although explosives-related training was not specifically
offered as a performance-based measure. In his paper, “Anti-Terrorism: Criteria, Tools &
Technology,” Joseph Smith of Applied Research Associates, Inc. points out that “it is
important to remember that security protection issues must be examined as a whole”
(Smith, 2003). Smith also acknowledges that “The best defense against death and injury
from bombing attacks is to prevent the attack from occurring (Smith, 2003).”
Understandably, preventing every attack should be the goal, but as history has
shown, it may not be possible. Nonetheless, making the training and information sharing
a priority can significantly reduce the risk of an attack.
As explosives threats continue to be classified as terrorism and occasional acts of
war employed by states, it is prudent to mention that numerous terroristic activities are
simply criminal acts committed by the unlawful. Even during combat operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan troops find themselves policing up the undesirables of the population.
Notably, within this population there is an abundance of lawlessness as well as available
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explosives material to carry out attacks. Therefore, it is crucial that both public,
specifically law enforcement, and private sectors meld together not only the training
needed to mitigate the risk of explosives-related threats, but also the intelligence required
to direct the effort toward pre-blast mitigation rather than post-blast response. Many
professionals, both in academia and industry, insist that this approach in enabling
response and security officials with knowledge will pay dividends in stopping attacks
altogether. Kathleen Kiernan, who participated in a committee workshop sponsored by
the National Research Council, shares this perspective. Kiernan points out by stating that
more involvement in information sharing can lead to a definition of what right looks like.
It‟s this philosophy, also exhibited by the military and law enforcement, which could give
those responsible for site security the necessary gut instincts which “would be helpful in
detecting IED-related anomalies (National Research Council, 2008).”
John Groves, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and professor at Drury
University at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, agrees with Kiernan‟s assessment. Groves,
which has over 40 years of law enforcement experience, states that one of the most
significant flaws in addressing such threats is a lack of information sharing between
competing agencies (Groves, 2010). The nation‟s own Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has specifically addressed this need in its 2010 budget; allocating $260 million of
its $42.7 billion to “fortify our intelligence system by improving information sharing and
analysis by potentially adding thousands more state and local level intelligence
analysts” (U.S. Government (OMB), 2010).
The philosophy and the investment coincides with the federal government‟s intent
on providing a more solid information framework in which all pertinent entities can
establish an intelligence and training dialogue for the good of preventing an explosives
attack. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created a federal mandate for agencies to
share certain information (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Audit Division, 2009). Subsequent efforts would further hone that concentration toward
explosives. In 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 (HSPD 19) outlined the
national policy “to counter the threat of explosive attacks aggressively by coordinating
Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal government efforts and collaborating with the
owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources to deter, prevent, detect,
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protect against, and respond to explosive attacks” (Department of Homeland Security,
2009). Sectors involved with operating critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR)
have developed a unique response to this collaboration under this and other directives,
which is discussed in Section 2.1.
Although this is the obvious position of the United States, it seems that the
implementation of the directive along with the availability of realistic and effective
explosives training is much more complicated. However, there has been some movement
on the directive which is revisited in Section 2.1. Still, the horror exists that the nation
will suffer once again an unimaginable attack, with the use of explosives, such as the
Beslan, Russia school tragedy in September 2004. In this vicious attack, over 300
innocent victims, more than half of which were children, were massacred in a three-day
standoff in which several dozen terrorists used firearms and IEDs. In his book, Terror at
Beslan, author and special operations instructor for an antiterrorism advisory group, John
Giduck, argues that the attack may be an indication of what is to come in America.
Giduck also claims to have attempted to offer his expert analysis of Beslan to officials at
the DHS; although this offer was never entertained (Giduck, 2005). Retired Army
Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman wrote the foreword for Giduck‟s book. In his words,
Grossman, who is a former West Point psychology professor and expert witness in the
government‟s case against Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, projects that the
lessons learned at Beslan must be applied to protect America‟s children from a similar
attack. The true enemy in Beslan, just three short years after 9-11, was the complacency
established in an already volatile state. Grossman further echoes Giduck‟s analysis that
those lessons include the implementation of comprehensive site security married with a
coordinated response. He states that children are the nation‟s most important resource and
that the most crucial task for America is “to protect our young” (Giduck, 2005). This
coincides with the DHS objective if America‟s young is considered a key resource and
America‟s schools are valuable infrastructure.
In the summer of 2010, the DHS moved again to improve the crosstalk between
agencies on all government levels. As part of its Counter Improvised Explosive Device
(CIED) Risk Communications initiative, the Human Factors Division of the DHS Science
and Technology component is funding a phased project to improve information sharing

7
about IED events (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Again, this is a
technologically-driven project that aspires to provide computer-based training scenarios
to all civil authorities and not an ERA initiative. As discussed in Section 2.1, CIED also
fulfills requirements outlined in HSPD 19. The DHS has other projects that address ERA
in some capacity; those are specifically detailed in Section 2.1 as well.
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2. BACKGROUND

2.1. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Since it was created in 2001 by President George W. Bush, the DHS has played a
major role in protecting the nation. The department is tasked with numerous aspects of
national security, including border and transportation security, law enforcement and
emergency response. In more recent times, the DHS has been active in defining and
regulating specific industries that hold vital interests for the nation‟s operational
capabilities. It is certainly pertinent to investigate that role when considering explosivesrelated threats in the country as the DHS is a major hub in dealing with mitigating risk
from those threats. The DHS risk assessment model is reviewed in Section 3.1.
Although substantial effort to create the office was in place prior to the September
11th attacks, it wasn‟t until shortly after the attacks that the Office of Homeland Security
was activated. The office, headed by former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, was
tasked to “oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country
against terrorism, and respond to any future attacks” (Borja, 2008). That fall, President Bush

issued the first HSPD, which created the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and further
defined the agency‟s role (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The following
year, the organization was propped up as a department of the federal government and
since then there has been 25 HSPDs issued.
Perhaps the best known directive is HSPD 3 which established the Homeland
Security Advisory System. Enacted in March of 2002, the system uses a five-tier, colorcoded classification to determine the nation‟s threat level and the protective measures
associated with each. According to the DHS website, where a more comprehensive
explanation of each level can be found, the goal is “to inform all levels of government
and local authority, as well as the public, to the current risk of terrorist acts.” Figure 2.1 is
an example of the warning system with each tier (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2010). At the time of this publication, the threat level was yellow.
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Figure 2.1. The Homeland Security Advisory System

Since the threat level advisory system has been implemented, the system has
peaked at the orange level several times, typically due to intelligence gathered from
suspected terrorists. The aviation threat level has peaked at red and normally remains at a
higher level for the transportation-specific sector. The chronology and recent status of the
Homeland Security Advisory System is a useful tool for facility managers to gain a
general awareness of the nation‟s threat status, but operators must establish their own
means of adjusting a facility‟s alert system. This can be accomplished simply by audible,
multi-media-based systems. The system can be updated to address a variety of situations
such as pending severe weather, public unrest and demonstrations, disgruntled employees
or financial breakdown. These threat levels should be part of the local emergency
response plan (LERP) and coincide with law enforcement‟s ability to respond to a
potential event.

10
The DHS has several components, many of which are law enforcement. Like most
governmental agencies, there is vast bureaucracy involved in determining jurisdictional
control. Table 2.1 shows the Department components and brief description of their
particular function (Department of Homeland Security, 2010).

Table 2.1. DHS components
Components

Principle Duties

Directorate for National Protection and Programs

Risk-reduction

Directorate for Science and Technology

Research and development

Directorate of Management

Budget and expenditures, HR

Office of Policy

Coordination and planning

Office of Health Affairs

Medical activities

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Information and intelligence

Office of Operations Coordination and Planning

Monitoring federal security

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Law enforcement training

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

Multi-level nuclear detection

Transportation Security Administration

Transportation systems protection

United States Customs and Border Protection

Protecting the country‟s borders

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

Immigration policies

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Border and infrastructure security

United States Coast Guard

Ports and waterways security

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Hazard preparedness

United States Secret Service

Government official protection

Under Science and Technology resides the Directorate‟s Explosives Division. Not
surprisingly, the division‟s main focus is directed around technological advancement and
not centered on developing ERA. According to the Explosives Division website, the unit
is seeking “effective techniques to protect our citizens and our country‟s infrastructure
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against the devastating effects of explosives by seeking innovative approaches in
detection, and in countermeasures” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Under the
objectives of the division is a training initiative for canines, an applicable approach for
facility managers as well and a discussion topic in Section 5.
As one can see, the main branches of the DHS are extensive and redundant in
regards to expertise. A brief overview of this particular agency serves to highlight the
DHS‟s functionality and set the foundation for historic and future goals as pertained to
fundamental explosives training in both the public and private realm.
2.1.1. HSPDs 19 and 7: the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
Authored in early 2007, the intent for HSPD 19 was to further define the nation‟s policy
in combating terroristic explosive threats. The government names the following
concentrations in achieving this goal:
applying techniques of psychological and behavioral sciences in the analysis of
potential threats of explosive attack;
using the most effective technologies, capabilities, and explosives search
procedures, and applications thereof, to detect, locate, and render safe explosives
before they detonate or function as part of an explosive attack, including detection
of explosive materials and precursor chemicals used to make improvised
explosive or incendiary mixtures;
applying all appropriate resources to pre-blast or pre-functioning search and
explosives render-safe procedures, and to post-blast or post-functioning
investigatory and search activities, in order to detect secondary and tertiary
explosives and for the purposes of attribution;
employing effective capabilities, technologies, and methodologies, including blast
mitigation techniques, to mitigate or neutralize the physical effects of an
explosive attack on human life, critical infrastructure, and key resources; and
clarifying specific roles and responsibilities of agencies and heads of agencies
through all phases of incident management from prevention and protection
through response and recovery (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
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The first goal is perhaps the most revealing aspect of this strategy, and likely the
least acted upon at the local level. Modern potential threat includes a variety of assailants
and not just radical terrorists as defined by the public‟s perception. Militia groups,
disgruntled employees, teenaged delinquents, activists, previously convicted criminals
and religious fanatics all can be terrorists. The psychological and behavioral approach,
however, takes a commonality among potential threats and concentrates the security
response toward actions rather than appearance and association. The DHS, as mentioned
in previous sections, has taken policy measures to ensure a broad approach is considered
when combating explosives-related threats.
Another interesting area is the final goal. When it comes to an explosives event,
the federal government continues to struggle with not only the proper response, but also
the ensuing investigation as well. To date, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) have struggled to work
within a clearly defined capacity when responding to explosives attacks and have toiled
over the implementation of the government‟s policies. Each also has had astounding
victories in stopping potential terror attacks. It is worthy to note that there exists other
directives and policies that relate to this subject, however, a comprehensive investigation
of these would deviate from the focus of this composition.
While policy implementation is an obvious problem not all of the federal
initiatives have been rejected from the cause nor have they stemmed ambiguity in
determining clear objectives The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) has
developed a model for site security that could be manipulated to fit any facility‟s needs.
Responding to HSPD 7, the purpose of the 2009 NIPP is to appoint the DHS the
leading governmental entity in defining CIKRs and working with private sectors to
ensure those assets are protected for the good of the nation. More specifically, the NIPP‟s
goal is to:
“ Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring,
neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy,
incapacitate, or exploit elements of our Nation‟s CIKR and to strengthen national
preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery of CIKR in the event of an attack,
natural disaster, or other emergency” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
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The NIPP, developed under former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, outlines a
comprehensive collaboration between a federal Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) and its
CIKR sector. Appendix A is a table from the NIPP that shows the agencies and sectors.
The NIPP further highlights utilization of risk management, as discussed in Section 3,
and continues to establish a working rapport between the private and public sectors
through the implementation of site security plans to protect the country‟s critical
resources. The plan is quite extensive, covering the scope of 18 identified CIKRs,
assigning areas of responsibility for specific agencies and revisiting HSPD 19. In the
plan, the Secretary of Homeland Security identifies the Office of Infrastructure Protection
(IP) as the coordinating group for explosives-related events. The IP is tasked specifically
with improving the effort to address IED-specific threats by “coordinating national and
intergovernmental IED security efforts; conducting requirements, capabilities, and gap
analyses; and promoting information-sharing and IED security awareness” (Department
of Homeland Security, 2009); all of which are reoccurring themes on the national level.
The NIPP also revisits several aspects of the DHS‟s role by stressing many points
of HSPD 19 and how the departmental crosstalk should coincide with the private sectors
obligated to protect resources and infrastructure. It also describes the need for better
information sharing, as stated in Section 1. The NIPP addresses this need by tasking the
DHS, stating it “will establish and maintain secure information-sharing systems to
provide law enforcement agencies and other first-responders with access to detailed
information that enhances the preparedness of Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial
government personnel to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to explosive
attacks in the United States” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The
aforementioned CIED Risk Communications initiative is a step in the right direction for
crucial information sharing. The NIPP also creates a working relationship to allow CIKR
sectors to develop site security plans, which are evaluated by the DHS on risk-based
performance measures (RBPMs). This approach allows a facility to develop its unique
plan, rather than having the execution of that plan dictated exclusively by the
government.
As part of its CIKR learning series, the DHS sponsors ongoing training events and
webinars to assist private sector facility operators to hone their site security to an
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acceptable level. In November 2009, Michael Norman, the IP Field Operations Branch
Chief and manager of the Protective Security Advisor (PSA) program presented a webbased training session explaining the branch and departmental role in providing site
assistance visits (SAVs). The purpose of SAVs is to assist a facility in the assessment of
its comprehensive security plan. The SAV concentrates on three aspects: physical
security, security management and the security force. The visit, part of a vulnerability
assessment, is guided under the PSA assigned to that region or state. Without having
taken part in such an assessment, this author is unaware of the weight explosives training
contributes to the security force.
The methodology of the survey is rather complex and involves hundreds of
variables with respect to the three security areas. The entire process is extensive, but the
gist is “to provide a valuable tool back to the owner/operator” in order to appropriately
assess the security risks (Norman, 2009). The assessment is designed to allow facility
managers to direct security efforts under DHS recommendations, conveyed to the facility
as a protective measure index (PMI). The feedback assigns a numerical ranking to each
area of security and allows the operator to manipulate data to adjust security efforts to the
need of the facility. This tool, also known as the Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST), is the
premise of site awareness and training and should be coupled with the site‟s
comprehensive risk management process. In fact, this approach can be accomplished on a
local level with many security upgrade solutions developed as no-cost alternatives by the
facility‟s own employees. This empowerment seems to be the standard for at least one
sector working to improve infrastructure protection against terrorists.
2.1.2. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Case Study. As discussed
in the previous section, there are 18 different sectors for which the DHS provides SSAs.
Perhaps the most impressive effort to date in fulfilling security requirements is the
Chemical Sector‟s approach to facilities security as outlined by the DHS. The program,
established in 2007, is known as the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard
(CFATS). The CFATS regulation is quite extensive, and given its current
implementation, is not completely understood by industry. The methodology of CFATS,
however, is the primary focus for relating chemical facility TTPs to other facilities
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seeking to combat explosives-related threats. Nonetheless, a brief history regarding the
participants and creation of CFATS is pertinent. As with any new regulation, there are
numerous consultants in line to assist each company in achieving the standard. Like risk
management though, many of these facilities may have the expertise they need to not
only meet the goals of CFATS, but also to develop their own standards that exceed the
federal regulation.
In 2004, a conglomerate of chemical sector professionals formed the industry‟s
Sector Security Council (SSC). This council, now comprised of 15 organizations and
corporations, including the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), partners directly
with the DHS in forming a union that addresses concerns within the industry and national
security. The SSC is also aiding the industry by “developing new initiatives to share
information and best practice; and enacting the regulations under CFATS” (Summit
Gazette, 2010). The council also works with the DHS in organizing an annual meeting of
professionals known as the Chemical Sector Security Summit. In 2010, the fourth annual
summit convened in Baltimore, Maryland, for two days of discussion, training, business
interaction and information sessions. The summit, designed to enhance the
communication of CFATS inquiries from the industry to DHS, succeeded in clearing the
goals of the standard creating a venue for professionals to discuss concerns in applying
CFATS to their facility. The DHS acknowledges this success as well.
The SSC, as well as the industry, receives tremendous praise from the DHS for its
continuing efforts to bring security of CIKR to the forefront. In his remarks to summit
participants, DHS IP Assistant Secretary Todd Keil states the “conference is a model for
the type and level of engagement we need if we are going to safeguard the Nation‟s
critical infrastructure” (Chemical Sector Security Summit Remarks, 2010). Homeland
Security Secretary Janet Napolitano attended the event as well, praising the NIPP, SSC
and CFATS as “Flexible, practical, and collaborative programs” that “play a key role in
enhancing the security and resiliency of our nation‟s chemical facilities and other critical
infrastructure” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Through the chemical SSA,
the industry also focuses somewhat on ERA.
Throughout the first of half of 2010, the chemical sector SSA sponsored several
Chemical Sector Explosive Threat Awareness Training (CSETAT) programs. The course

16
is a six-module, one-day event geared to offer chemical facility security personnel a
closer look at IEDs and to enhance the “chemical sector‟s ability to deter, prevent, detect,
protect against, and respond to attacks that use IEDs” (Department of Homeland
Security, 2010). This training is unique to the chemical sector and provides facility
managers a psychological edge in ERA by incorporating a legitimate threat to crucial
infrastructure, a focus again echoed in Section 5. The training revisits the NIPP and
applicable HSPDs, as well as trends in terrorism, IED and VBIED (vehicle-borne IED)
design, incidents and explosive effects, IED trends, indicators and detection, and
surveillance detection (Miller, 2010). This approach psychologically prepares the security
officials within the industry with a foundation of IED knowledge that can be married with
a basic understanding of explosives components. The program also updates CFATS as
well. Appendix B shows the CSETAT information flyer for 2010. The program is slated
to continue again in 2011. Besides, the aforementioned program, the DHS has other
explosive initiatives as well.
2.1.3. Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats. Additional
programs under the office include the Office of Bomb Prevention‟s “Tripwire,” which is
an information and IED communication medium; the multi-jurisdictional IED site plan
(MJIEDSP), which allows communities to share and respond to events; and perhaps the
department‟s most legitimate effort to enhance ERA, the Center of Excellence (COE) for
the Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats or ALERT.
Originating in 2008, ALERT is a multi-agency effort that includes not only
governmental involvement, but also academia and industrial participation. Some of the
nation‟s most renowned research facilities, along with successful research corporations
and esteemed S&T institutions, have combined to form a comprehensive educational
approach to explosives threats. Albeit a concerted technological venture, ALERT is a
copacetic opportunity to establish a joint concentration aimed at bringing ERA to the
forefront of technology, in both detection and blast mitigation. The program also focuses
on developing future experts in the explosives field by developing recruiting plans to
entice potential law enforcement professionals into the realm of advanced explosives
training.
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Northeastern University in Boston and the University of Rhode Island are leading
the COE‟s effort to bring to the table all entities with a legitimate interest in explosives
detection and characterization and blast mitigation. ALERT specifically is geared to
“conduct transformational research, technology and educational development for
effective characterization, detection, mitigation and response to the explosives-related
threats facing the country and the world” (Northeastern University, 2010). As mentioned,
ALERT has an impressive core partnership as well. The Northeastern University website
lists all the affiliates as of 2010. Those participants are listed in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2. ALERT partners
Academic
Boston University, California Institute of Technology, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Missouri University of Science & Technology, New Mexico State
University, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Soreq Nuclear Research Center, Texas
Tech University, University of Puerto Rico at Mayagüez, Washington State University
Strategic
Idaho National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Massachusetts General Hospital,
Tufts University, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Industrial/Governmental
Analogic Corporation, American Science & Engineering, John Adams Innovation
Institute, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Raytheon Company, Siemens Corporate
Research, Textron Systems Corporation

There are several other underlying participants in the program as well. As
mentioned previously, ALERT comprises a multi-focused effort to not only explore a
partnership with the nation‟s explosives experts, but it also defines each highlytechnological research effort.
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ALERT has four main research initiatives: explosives characterization, explosives
sensors, explosives sensor systems and post-blast mitigation. Each program, recognized
as F1, F2, F3 and F4, respectively, are strictly technology-based plans to improve
detection and barrier systems. However, these core initiatives are married with an
educational initiative led by the University of Rhode Island. The aim is to “establish a
conduit that includes precollege, undergraduate, graduate and career professional
components” and train those future leaders “who will be important contributors to DHS
and to the success of its critical mission” (Northeastern University, 2010). That “critical
mission” is to further develop a defense against terrorist threats using explosives and
enhance the security for CIKR on which the nation depends. As part of this research, a
comprehensive short-course was developed to address local security threats and is
discussed in greater detail in Section 4.
The education phase of ALERT is a genuine route for law enforcement seeking to
specialize in advance explosives training. Outside of a few universities, though, first
responders must network on all governmental levels to gain that knowledge, unless a
private company is compensated to provide the ERA training. Even rarer is the offer of a
formal explosives degree or authentic certification in academia. But under the ALERT
initiative, high-school and community college students, undergraduates and graduates can
obtain the advanced training and education from universities such as Missouri S&T
which offer several levels of explosives education. In fact, Missouri S&T seems ideal for
obtaining ALERT‟s goals due to its variety in explosives education where “students have
the exclusive opportunity to safely handle and employ explosives in various disciplines
while pursuing either an explosives engineering emphasis or certificate, explosives
engineering minor and an Explosives Engineering Master of Science” (Hawkins, 2010).
Facility managers must also find ways for their security professionals to gain ERA
training as well. As stated in the previous section, the chemical sector has made available
such training through the DHS.
Obviously there is a distinctive technological concentration to mitigate
explosives-related threats. What‟s more, there are even specialized training sessions
available if companies know where to seek the information. But where the initiative falls
short is on the implementation of ERA for site security and the psychological
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attentiveness, or rather the presence of complacency and obliviousness, to the dangers
facing communities daily. Protecting the country, and making known these threats, is a
primary role of the federal government.
2.2. FEDERAL EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATORS
Outside of the military, there are two primary investigating agencies when
explosives-related threats surface on a national level. Both the FBI and ATF have distinct
jurisdiction in intelligence gathering and post-blast investigation. The FBI has its
Explosives Unit (EU) which is tasked with conducting “examinations of evidence
associated with bombing matters” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). According to
the agency, the EU is involved with bombing scenes and IED component identification.
The FBI also has 15 explosives detection canines in its police force. These dogs are a
viable component to a site‟s explosives security plan and, as discussed Section 5, can be
trained exclusively on a reward system, which is difficult to execute with humans.
Implemented over the last decade, FBI dogs are trained to detect over 19,000 explosives
compounds (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).
The FBI has the primary obligation to investigate terrorism in the United States.
This authority has been granted throughout the last three decades, primarily through
Presidential Directives (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Audit Division, 2009). Considering IEDs are a growing weapon of choice by terrorists, it
stands to reason that the agency must arm itself with explosives-related knowledge and
capabilities in order to effectively respond to possible terrorist attacks which involve
explosives. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reports that in 2009, there
were nearly 11,000 terror attacks worldwide (U.S. State Department, 2010). This
alarming increase must signal to federal agencies that developing and implementing a
sound education and response plan must be in the forefront of the national strategy.
From the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, a DHS COE at the University of Maryland, Figure 2.2 shows the exponential
increase in the usage of IEDs as terrorists‟ weapons of choice (University of Maryland,
2010).
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Figure 2.2. Terrorist usage of IEDs worldwide, 1970-2007

When it comes to explosives regulations, the ATF has the lead. Reassigned to the
DOJ in early 2003 under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the ATF has been primarily
responsible for the explosives industry. The agency‟s most legitimate explosives effort to
date is ensuring proper storage and licenses of explosives and enforcement of the SEA of
2002. More details about the SEA are discussed in the following section.
Like the FBI, the ATF has an explosives detection canine program as well. To
date, the agency has deployed over 300 canines worldwide trained to detect similar
compounds as the FBI trained force (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, 2010). As with the FBI‟s EU, the ATF employs its own explosives experts.
A Certified Explosives Specialist (CES) is tasked with conducting investigations
regarding explosives and explosives regulations. The CES is a special agent with the ATF
required to acquire two years of training (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, 2010). The ATF also trains Explosives Enforcement Officers (EEOs). These
experts have more extensive duties than the CES and offer a wide range of services. From
the ATF website, an EEO is trained in:
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Providing technical advice/assistance on Federal storage regulations and
the handling or disposing of explosives;
Threat and infrastructure vulnerability assessments both domestically and
abroad;
Constructing facsimiles of explosive devices;
Preparing determinations on explosive, incendiary, and destructive devices
for court proceedings;
Providing expert witness testimony;
Conducting render safe/disassembly procedures on explosive and
incendiary devices and materiel;
Conducting large scale explosive destruction operations;
Operational & training support to state/local, national and international
agencies and interests;
Underwater explosives dive and recovery operations;
Research studies and analyses of explosives-related equipment and
materiel;
Supporting National Special Security Events and other major events
(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2010).
Besides providing explosives experts, the ATF is charged with maintaining
the Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS). This is a web-based database which
provides all levels of law enforcement “access to national arson and explosives
incident information” (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2010).
While BATS seems like an extraordinary tool for explosives investigators across the
nation, it has some issues with information sharing. These problems, as well as other
investigative barriers between the ATF and FBI, are discussed in Section 2.2.2. As
mentioned in previous sections, there is little doubt that the U.S. policy regarding
explosives-related threats is firm in intention. However, like previously noted, the
problem is not the strategy, but rather the implementation of regulations such as the
SEA, an effort with which the ATF continues to struggle.
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2.2.1. The Safe Explosives Act of 2002. The ATF‟s 2007 edition of Federal
Explosives Law and Regulations incorporates extensive revisions from the SEA.
According to then director, Michael Sullivan, the SEA was developed to ensure that
explosives materials were protected from use in IEDs. Sullivan states in the law that
“Security of all explosives materials is an essential tool in the war against terrorism”
(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2007). The former director
reverts to the importance of implementing the SEA stating that the ATF takes the role in
ensuring proper implementation of the SEA for securing explosives, but he also
acknowledges that “internal controls and industry-created publications also support the
secure and safe storage of explosives materials” (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives, 2007).
This philosophy coincides with the overall premise; which is more specifically
outlined in Section 3.2, that companies are well served to exceed standards through selfregulating standard operating procedures (SOPs). These SOPs should be comprehensive,
applied, practical and dynamic with continuous improvements. Methods for achieving
this goal are outlined in Section 3.2 as well.
The SEA‟s main purpose is to define persons who are prohibited from receiving
or handling explosives. Effective January 2003, the prohibited persons category was
expanded and the ATF became more involved in guaranteeing that proper background
checks were conducted to ensure safe explosives handling. Besides industry, this standard
applies to academic institutions and businesses outside of military occupational
specialties which require explosives handling. Missouri S&T‟s explosives engineering
program conducts background checks of all students enrolled in an explosives course.
Although the ATF has received criticism in implementing the SEA, facilities must ensure
these checks are conducted for the safety of their employees, contractors and visitors.
Table 2.3 has the complete list of prohibited persons (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, 2002).
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Table 2.3. ATF‟s list of prohibited persons
Prohibited Persons
Aliens (with some exceptions)*
Persons dishonorably discharged from the military*
U.S. citizens who have renounced their citizenship*
Convicted felons
Users and addicts of controlled substances
Fugitives
Mental defectives or persons committed to mental institutions
* These categories were added to the SEA 2002

All categories of prohibited persons may apply for relief from explosives
disabilities by filing with the ATF. However, each company employing potential
explosives handlers must take measures that protect the public and limit access to
materials that can be used in an attack. Additionally, those tasked with security of a
facility that utilizes explosives must become familiar with the regulation. This provides a
secondary system of checks for site security, and if a company‟s security component is
aware of those people who are permitted to handle explosives on site, then the likelihood
that prohibited persons come in contact with explosives is reduced.
While the introduction of the SEA seems a worthy undertaking, the ATF has
received severe criticism with regards to its implementation. Again, the reoccurring
theme is not the problem with policy, as there seems to be more than an adequate
compilation of regulations on the federal level, but rather the process of implementing
that policy.
2.2.2. Office of the Inspector General Reports. As part of the process to ensure
the policies of the government are properly employed; a system of studies is emplaced.
Often times, these investigations stem from anonymous information obtained from the
applicable industry, or the tragic consequence of a catastrophic event, such as the 9-11
Commission. In either case, the process involves official probes into the execution of
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lawmakers‟ intent. That jurisdiction on the national level, as it pertains to the health and
welfare of citizens, lies with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
In March 2005, the OIG published a report regarding the ATF‟s implementation
of the SEA. The “Review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives‟
Implementation of the Safe Explosives Act” is highly critical of the ATF‟s initial efforts
in completing appropriate background checks for possessors of explosives and
identifying those who may have been prohibited persons. The report, which exceeds 100
pages, states that there are “critical deficiencies in the ATF‟s implementation of the
background check and clearance process that prevented the agency from ensuring that
prohibited persons are denied access to explosives” (Office of the Inspector General,
2005). In short, there are already citizens within the community handling explosives that
should not be. For those within the industry, this is probably not a surprise. The report‟s
conclusions, which many have been disputed by the ATF, reinforce the idea that policy
makers once again created a realistic avenue to combat explosives-related threats just to
fall short in implementing the standards. In just two years since the SEA went into effect,
the agency charged with upholding explosives regulations was bombarded with questions
of competency.
Notwithstanding the intentions of the investigation, is it a fair assessment to not
only create a system of licensing and handling with federal oversight, but also to
encourage the lowest level of scrutiny possible. Considering the horrific consequences if
nefarious possessors of explosives are not identified, each entity concerned with site
security, especially vulnerable sites as hospitals and schools, must then become more
vigilant in understanding what explosives can do and what components of IEDs may look
like.
The findings by the OIG are more profound than just background checks. The
report criticizes other aspects of the SEA‟s implementation. These conclusions range
from delayed investigations of explosives licensees, the ATF‟s knowledge and tracking
of prohibited persons, failure to properly train inspectors on the SEA and coordination of
investigations with the FBI. The OIG cites that “comparison of ATF and FBI data found
no record that the ATF requested FBI background checks on 59 of 683 employees of
explosive licensees (9 percent) whose ATF records we examined” and it was also found
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“that the ATF had failed to complete the background check process for over half (655 of
1,157) of the individuals identified by the FBI as possible prohibited persons” (Office of
the Inspector General, 2005). From the findings, it appears the FBI and ATF have done
little to help one another, even when national security is on the line. Not surprisingly, the
relationship between the ATF and FBI has soured the intent of the SEA as well. This is
more evident in another OIG report.
In October 2009, the OIG released its “Explosives Investigation Coordination
Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives.” Leading up to the report, the DOJ took several measures in
clearing the explosives investigation boundaries between the ATF and FBI. As discussed
in the 2005 report, the animosity between the two agencies might have well been created
when the decision was made to include the ATF into the DOJ ranks, historically the
FBI‟s turf. While the 2005 publication found fault mainly with the ATF though, in this
more recent probe both agencies receive harsh criticism.
After the merger into the DOJ, the ATF was required to work together with the
FBI under the stipulations discussed in Section 2.2. Nonetheless, a series of
memorandums and directives from the Homeland Security Act to this latest report was
unable to create a lucid guideline in which all involved would play nice. One of the
primary points of contention is the authority over an explosives investigation, in which
the OIG describes both agencies at fault. The report points out that if terror or suspected
terror is involved, then the FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) have jurisdiction.
The OIG backed its disputed findings with surveys conducted with agents of both
components, a methodology used with local laws enforcement in this composition to
analyze the effectiveness of ERA training. Even employees of the ATF and FBI agreed
that jurisdictional disputes disrupted timely and precise investigations, with upwards of
90-percent stating that conflict existed over which agency should lead the investigation
(U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, 2009). This
sentiment has trickled down to state and local responders as well with nearly all of the
respondents agreeing that the federal response is nothing more than an ambulance chase
for accolades. This perception not only denies the national agencies respect, but also
draws incongruent focus intended by the SEA. With response to explosives events being
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the most contested issue in federal reaction, the OIG report actually contains 15
recommendations for improving working relations between the FBI and ATF. These
include consistencies in explosives training, the use of canines, improving BATS and
requiring the FBI to provide information to the ATF‟s tracking database and explosives
handling procedures (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit
Division, 2009).
The OIG reports should not be used as stand-alone documents to discredit the
national effort. Rather, facilities across the country must recognize that with significant
flaws in protection against explosives-related threats comes the opportunity to develop a
unique and comprehensive approach to site security. This system, coupled with the
continued effort of the federal authority, must entail a focus on education and training
and not just reliance that the federal government, or private security companies for that
matter, will foil every attack; especially when there seems to be numerous flaws in
information sharing and implementation. Facilities have an obligation to protect, and
sometimes that protection comes at a cost. Owners and operators must make every
reasonable attempt to create an authentic protection plan that includes information
sharing and addresses the specific needs to the company. This effort expands well beyond
technology.
2.3. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES
The United States has a robust private security industry. Many companies offer
various training and services from which facilities managers may opt for a specialization,
like that of the chemical sector. The availability of these products is much too vast to
cover within this analysis. Likewise, this author has no intent of offering free advertising
for the numerous companies offering explosives classes and training in the thousands of
dollars. Although it is necessary to acknowledge that for a price specific explosives
training is available. Not only will companies offer expertise in ERA, providing that the
investment is made to obtain their product, but these same companies will also fulfill the
risk management need. These professionals, most of which are credible and qualified,
make substantial profit providing a company a product which is simply arranged.
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Nonetheless, many within the industry lobby for more training and exposure to realistic
threats in order to better protect the facility where they work and themselves.
In a free market society, a climate exists where those with knowledge can provide
services for those who are willing to pay for it. Companies peddle their expertise to the
tune of $500-$1,000 a day for explosives training. Training kits, such as IED packages
that include simulated explosives devices, can cost in the thousands and even tens of
thousands. There is no question that many of these resources are applicable to site
security, however, unlike the nation‟s budget for detection systems and barriers, the goal
of ERA training must be achieved at much lesser cost. Many local and state budgets
simply cannot absorb the expenditure of this expensive training. But, with the proper
network and attitude, low-cost, effective ERA training can be co-sponsored among first
response agencies and a collaborative effort can be made to co-host either private
companies or academic professionals to offer the applicable classes. The goal is to get
those tasked with security a basic knowledge of explosives, not to make them experts.
A common question in the ERA training discussed in Section 4 is “What does an
IED look like?” Instructors with even the basic knowledge of IEDs know that the
mechanism can take on the appearance of countless devices, limited only to the
manufacturers‟ imagination. Therefore, rather than spending thousands of dollars for a
training kit, site security forces can devise their own with common items found in retail
stores or strewn about the property. A reasonable approach to spotting out-of-theordinary components is the key to ERA and not necessarily the ability to identify the
explosives itself. Couple that focus with the use of canines and simple standoff, a
foundation of site security has been laid at a relatively low expense. Some of these basic
concepts and recommended solutions are outlined in Section 5.
In the meantime, facilities can establish communication with all levels of
government support and begin their site assessments. They can take advantage of lowcost approaches, like that of chemical sector‟s CSETAT, or continue to seek high-paid
consultancy for ERA, site surveys and risk management. Until each sector defined in the
NIPP undertakes a strict approach that encompasses diligent protection of CIKR, to
include vulnerable humans, each facility must establish a process that prepares its
employees.
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3. RISK MANAGEMENT

3.1. EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT MODELS
Inherent in every successful operation is a comprehensive and continuous risk
management process. Facility managers must understand the incessant nature of risk and
how it applies to their procedures and infrastructure. Much of what is discussed about
implementing risk management and how it pertains to every legitimate business is
derived from the author‟s nearly two decades of military service and advanced
knowledge of composite risk management (CRM). As with other sections of this
composition, risk management is a crucial component of ERA and basic security needs.
Therefore, a military model, as well as other examples, will be utilized to convey the
importance of CRM within any environment. Additionally, owners and operators
concerned with explosives threats will be given insight on how a distinctive change in
attitude and behavior will pay dividends in morale, prestige and even profit. The most
impressive aspect of CRM is the fact that it is extremely cost effective and can be
implemented by the facility‟s own employees. The subsequent text details other
advantages that better prepare a facility‟s security force on a psychological level.
3.1.1. United States Army. There are two basic approaches to risk; acceptance
and mitigation. Militarily, leaders are trained to recognize a variety of hazards that may
alter a mission or harm troops. The U.S. Army instills risk mitigation at the earliest level
of soldier development. As with government regulations, such as the CFATS example in
Section 2, there are countless private companies ready to offer costly consultancy to aid
in developing a risk model for a particular entity. However, the military approach is to
inculcate a behavior change that gives a psychological advantage to its own personnel.
Facility operators, using this same philosophy coupled with appropriate ERA training,
will have a tremendous psychological edge as well. As cited in the Army‟s own
Composite Risk Management field manual, FM 5-19, CRM is an amalgamation of past
experience and decision making that results in “teaching Soldiers [sic] „how to think‟
rather than telling them „what to think‟ ” (Department of the Army, HQ, 2006). The
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subsequent text briefly outlines the military CRM model and further relates the model to
the NIPP‟s approach as outlined by the DHS strategy on risk mitigation.
The Army CRM FM 5-19 is an extremely helpful tool for leaders at all levels. It
implements an approach of reason and proven TTPs rather than a complex computerbased application that possesses no ability to think. As well, the FM 5-19 further relates
this suggested common-sense approach as a substitute to those believing that risk can be
adequately wrapped into software. It states that “Technical competency, operational
experience, and lessons-learned weigh higher than any set of alpha-numeric codes.
Mathematics and matrixes are not a substitute for sound judgment” (Department of the
Army, HQ, 2006). This point, not only valid, but also pertinent to any operation, is
objectively made despite the Army‟s own use of a matrix-based assessment. The fact is
that algorithms should be tools to aid in the CRM process and not as substitutes to logical
thinking freely exercised by the personnel on site. Again, today there seems to be a strict
focus on technology, like the billions of dollars spent on detection equipment and
complex barriers, rather than a low-cost, common-sense approach. When considering the
intrinsically catastrophic effects of an explosives event, it is unwise to trust a machine to
dictate crisis management. The Army‟s use of CRM is a reasonable approach which
incorporates all aspects of the process into a quick reference. As well, it assigns
responsibility to the appropriate level of the decision-making process rather than allowing
inexperienced leaders to accept unnecessary risk.
The model consists of a five-step process. This method begins by identifying the
hazards, assessing the hazards, developing controls and making decisions, implementing
the controls and supervising the process and evaluating the outcome. As discussed later,
there are other models available which use similar guidelines in evaluating and managing
risk. Figure 3.1 shows the cyclic and continuous process of the Army CRM process as
shown in the FM 5-19.
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Figure 3.1. The Army risk management model

The CRM model is designed to apply to any mission or operation at any level. In
the military, a CRM worksheet is completed prior to convoys, physical fitness training,
range qualification and any other training event.
Perhaps the most important part of the process is assessing the appropriate
hazards. Like most risk management models, the Army uses two main variables as
functions of risk to identify and attempt to quantify the hazards that may affect an
operation. These components of risk address the likelihood the event will occur and the
effects on personnel and equipment if it does transpire. The FM 5-19 contains specific
definitions for each and categorizes the two criteria as probability and severity. Most
models of risk management use some form of each category. Figure 3.2 shows the
Army‟s risk management matrix.
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Figure 3.2. The Army risk management matrix

The probability section has five categories: frequent, likely, occasional, seldom
and unlikely. The FM 5-19 provides leaders specific definitions for each to allow more
objectivity in assessing the hazard (Department of the Army, HQ, 2006).
Frequent – Occurs very often, known to happen regularly.
Likely – Occurs several times, a common occurrence.
Occasional – Occurs sporadically, but is not uncommon.
Seldom – Remotely possible, could occur at some time.
Unlikely – Can assume will not occur, but not impossible.
Once the probability of the hazard is defined, leaders look into the severity of the
event if it was to occur. Severity has four categories: catastrophic, critical, marginal and
negligible. Definitions for the categories of severity are much more conducive to mission.
However, a brief range from the FM 5-19 spans from “catastrophic” as total operational
failure and death to “negligible” being little or no impact on the operation. After
probability and severity are determined, the matrix allows leaders to join the two to
determine an overall risk level for the mission. The risk levels are: extremely high, high,
moderate and low.
The next step in the CRM is to mitigate hazards by developing and implementing
controls to reduce the overall risk level. The highest risk hazard is the level accepted for
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the mission. Once the risk level has been established, responsibility is assigned as to
whether to conduct the operation or attempt to further mitigate unacceptable hazards.
This entire process is completed on a “Risk Management Worksheet.” Appendix C is an
example of a completed worksheet on which hazards and controls are identified for a
company‟s rifle qualification range. The residual risk becomes the conscientious focus
for the appropriate authority. For the military, this risk decision is based on the risk level
and may span from a company commander for low risk training to a division commander
for extremely high risk missions. A civilian facility or operation can mirror this process
by allowing qualified personnel to make the appropriate decision on the low end of the
assessment to as high as owners for the more risky decisions. For instance, an
ammunition manufacturer may routinely assign a moderate risk to facility operations.
However, with intelligence geared toward attacks on the facility coupled with an
elevation in the Homeland Security Advisory System, plant managers may opt for an
extremely high risk level. In correlation, a gate guard at the same facility may point out to
her supervisor that visibility is obscured due to weather conditions for the day. The
facility, not needing a plant manager to adjust the risk level, may empower that security
supervisor to raise the risk from low to moderate.
The Army‟s risk management model is simplistic and easy to use. It‟s also a
readily available tool that can be completed on all levels at any site. It is important to note
that it is impossible to mitigate all risks and there will always be hazards present,
identifiable or not. The purpose of assigning responsibility for the varying risk levels is to
make the final risk acceptance authority accountable. This procedure is utilized somewhat
by other governmental agencies as well.
3.1.2. DHS Risk Management in the NIPP. The DHS model for risk
management is similar to that of the Army‟s and other genuine professions. This section
contains a brief summary of the DHS risk management process and draws comparisons
and contrasts to the military model. The procedures for mitigating risk are commonplace
among public organizations and can easily be applied to most entities. In the NIPP, the
risk management process is regarded as “the cornerstone” of the plan (Department of
Homeland Security, 2009). It is this philosophy, that incorporating realistic risk
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management is actually cost saving in both resources and expenditures, which generates a
psychological advantage of prevention rather than reaction. Also like the military, the
DHS version is a cyclic model that requires continuous assessment in order to protect
CIKR. Figure 3.3 shows the NIPP risk management framework (Department of
Homeland Security, 2009).

Figure 3.3. NIPP risk management framework

The first step to the NIPP‟s risk management model is to set goals and objectives
considering the physical, cyber and human elements with regards to CIKR protection.
This approach, unlike the Army model in which encompasses all justifiable risks without
being categorized, provides a risk management focus for facility managers. The “human”
aspect provides a psychological legitimacy of which there is an acknowledgment that
attitude and behavior, complacency and resiliency are indeed credible functions of the
risk management process. The goals and objectives are specific to the cause of the
company and should be direct and well-defined.
Once a site properly identifies the goals, it must continue with identifying the
resources in which a developed plan can become reality. In identifying these assets, or
systems and networks that exist to aid the facility, a consideration must be given to the
availability of the asset. For example, although federal explosives databases are an asset,
specifically the BATS system discussed in Section 2.2, the usability and timely update of
the system may not be an asset, but rather a hindrance. Nonetheless, site operators must
take advantage of all available resources with the understanding that any one of those can
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be made unavailable during an emergency. The more a company can put into place its
own systems, like those discussed in the following section, the more it can rely on the
data.
The next step to the NIPP framework is assessing the risk. As shown in the
previous figure, risk is defined as a function of consequence, vulnerability and threat.
This coincides with most basic models which consider the likelihood and severity of the
event. As stated in the NIPP, “it is important to think of risk as influenced by the nature
and magnitude of a threat, the vulnerabilities to that threat, and the consequences that
could result” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The following of each definition
comes from the NIPP text and gives clear and concise structure with regards to risk
assessment:
Consequence: The effect of an event, incident, or occurrence; reflects the level,
duration, and nature of the loss resulting from the incident. For the purposes of the
NIPP, consequences are divided into four main categories: public health and
safety (i.e., loss of life and illness); economic (direct and indirect); psychological;
and governance/mission impacts.
Vulnerability: Physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open
to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard. In calculating the risk of an
intentional hazard, a common measure of vulnerability is the likelihood that an
attack is successful, given that it is attempted.
Threat: Natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or
indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment,
and/or property. For the purpose of calculating risk, the threat of an intentional
hazard is generally estimated as the likelihood of an attack being attempted by an
adversary; for other hazards, threat is generally estimated as the likelihood that a
hazard will manifest itself. In the case of terrorist attacks, the threat likelihood is
estimated based on the intent and capability of the adversary.
Once again, the model contains significant similarities to the Army‟s approach
and provides a method for calculating the risk as it applies to the facility. Even more
crucial than assessing all possible threats is deciding which ones to mitigate in great

35
detail and which ones must be realistically accepted. This is covered in the next step of
the framework.
After the risks are identified and assessed, prioritizing the most substantial and
applicable must take place. This stage, as it pertains to CIKR covered in the NIPP, is a
sector-specific approach on a broad level, but must take an intimate focus for a single
site. Owners must take into account the cost effectiveness of mitigating the risk and
which hazard should receive not only the money, but also the attention. In the Army, a
traditional phrase of such prioritization focuses that attention as it relays time
management to a rifle qualification. For pop-up silhouettes on the rifle range, the closer
targets tend to stay exposed for the shorter amount of time. The farther a target, the
longer it stays exposed. Therefore, soldiers are encouraged to engage the closest target
first. The same applies to a company attempting to prioritize its risks. If the site is
planning a long-term event that exposes its infrastructure or employees, proper
consideration must spotlight the timeframe as well as the functions of risk. Put more
simply, security officials must engage more pressing threats rather than spending time
planning for possible future threats. This does not mean that those risks are not assessed,
but rather that crucial resources be allocated to mitigate the immediate problem. Longterm threats also may change in time or prove false altogether.
Subsequent to prioritization is implementing the plan. This is a time where the
best possible solution has been devised to “prevent, deter, and mitigate the threat; reduce
vulnerability to an attack or other disaster; minimize consequences; and enable timely,
efficient response and restoration in a post-event situation, whether a terrorist attack,
natural disaster, or other incident” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Like
identification of pertinent resources and assets, putting into action a risk management
plan is subject to variables in the system. A major component of this is the cost
effectiveness of the solution. Often times an episode could have been prevented if enough
money was thrown at the problem. But if a company is bankrupt, the risk management
process is moot. Therefore, cooperative training programs, employee feedback,
psychological tools and common-sense solutions must be entertained to offset extreme
costs. Most industries are succumbing to best-available technology to alleviate systematic
issues, but that technology, as noted in the previous sections, can be costly and difficult to
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utilize. The NIPP continues to extensively cover plan implementation and provides
numerous programs on which sectors can rely.
Perhaps the most critical component of the DHS risk management model is
measuring the effectiveness of the plan. This step can be achieved in many ways but must
coincide with the intent of the goal and objective. Like the after action review (AAR) in
the Army, timely feedback must be obtained in order to improve or abandon processes
not accomplishing the standard. This feedback can be ascertained at any stage of the
cycle and should come in the form of legitimate improvement to the plan rather than pure
criticism without solution. A suggested method in quantitatively gauging the security
effort is the test of a practical pilot. This method, as discussed in Section 5, tests security
TTPs prior to and after ERA. Its intent is to improve procedures through statistical
analysis of a cost-effective training program. For facilities and sectors using RBPMs, it is
also a method of checking the success or failure of the standard. Most importantly, it
gives owners a baseline as to whether a new plan needs to be created and implemented or
if a proven tactic can be improved upon.
The risk management system is just one component, albeit a critical one, of ERA
and how it applies to overall site security from explosives-related threats. As the need for
training comes to light, facility managers have been given so far basic tools and
considerations for protection against explosives events. It is up to them to establish a
standard operating procedure.
3.2 DEVELOPING A STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
The goal of an SOP is to establish protocol within a unit. It must exceed every
regulatory expectation. Additionally, it must be exposed to third party review. This
review can be from partners in the industry or even government employees. Regardless of
the design of an SOP, it must be living proof of the procedures in which a facility
incorporates under certain tests. Site security is just that, an essential daily test of the
ability of the owners and operators to provide a safe environment for protection of their
people, products and infrastructure; especially when dealing with explosives-related
threats. This section provides examples of successfully implemented “self-regulation.” It
also discusses monetary benefits as well as the safety measures that lead to efficiency in
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production and public relations. In order to develop a process in which SOPs for ERA
and site security are legitimate and detailed, companies must assume an appropriate risk
management method and incorporate routinely a basis for review. The mining industry is
particularly scrutinized publicly for not practicing established SOP or for blatantly
violating federal regulations. Yet the industry has taken great strides to enhance public
opinion of the necessary trade. The environmental impact of mining, and how the
industry has approached criticism, acts as a superb example of how facilities can take
government regulation, like CFATS practices, and incorporate a program under their own
volition that exceeds the standards. Environmental disaster and the mitigation thereof, is
also perfect illustration as to the cost and consequence of letting safety and risk
management falter. Disasters of significant consequences, such as oil spills, are perfect
examples.
At the time of this publication, British Petroleum has spent over $11 billion
following the April 2010 oil rig explosion. The company has set aside a trust for another
$20 billion to settle future claims. Coincidently, the company released a report in the fall
of 2010 announcing a new Safety and Risk Operation promising “sweeping changes” in
the company‟s risk and safety approach (British Petroleum, 2010). Lost in the monetary
obligation of BP is the fact that 11 employees were killed in the explosion that spilled oil
throughout the Gulf Coast. The following initiatives will guide facility managers through
a psychological approach to safety rather than just a “check the box” mentality.
Furthermore, it develops an understanding that self-regulating procedures outweigh the
potential effects of disaster.
3.2.1. International Organization for Standardization; ISO 14001.
Non-governmental organizations can act as proponents of both industry and government.
The intent of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is to serve as an
institute that “enables a consensus to be reached on solutions that meet both the
requirements of business and the broader needs of society” (International Organization
for Standardization, 2010). The ISO, while mandated by some governmental agencies for
particular industries under specific conditions, allows for businesses in most countries to
understand community impact and develop procedures to continually evaluate and
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improve operations to benefit the society in which it is located and the bottom line for the
company. While the ISO has its own recently published, broad guideline for risk
management, ISO 31000, a non-certification standard released in 2009, it is another
standard on which this analysis will center. In mining, the standard that exercises the
aforementioned principles is ISO 14001, “Specification of Environmental Management
Systems.”
Part of the ISO 14000 series, the most recent edition of the 2004 standard is
geared toward a company‟s environmental management system which enables
participants to freely incorporate the standard‟s principles and develop solutions to
potential impacts to the environment. These developed systems will vary greatly with
industry. Often, this conformity is subject to a third party check that is not only familiar
with the industry, but also the standard. More briefly, it permits companies to develop
measures to an improving system that allows for review and maneuver, this is a
reasonable approach to developing an SOP against explosives-related threats as well.
While the requirements are numerable, the gist of the program is to give a site the
freedom to initiate its own measures, but it allows for a system of checks and balances by
subjecting the program to continuous improvement and review by qualified professionals.
Most participants in ISO 14001 cite tremendous advantages in implementing the
standard.
A system that creates more work and uses additional resources but lowers cost
seems counter intuitive. However, many companies participating in ISO 14001 have cited
significant results in their investment, not to mention the benefits received once the
public acknowledges that a strict standard has been successfully implemented under selfregulation, all the while exceeding legislative requirements. It only makes sense, as
discussed in Section 5, to appropriately inform the community about the company‟s
safeguards. As noted, “the benefits…are greatly diminished if customers and the general
public are not made aware of this achievement” (Morris, 2004). Research has shown that
most companies agree with this opportunity to self-regulate, although many, like the
chemical sector working under CFATS, still have questions about implementation.
A study published in 2003 by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
investigated the tradeoff of participating in environmental management systems. Included
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in the findings was “positive observed impacts on the economic performance of these
participating facilities” and more than half expressed a reduction in liability (UNC
Department of Public Policy, 2003). These investments go further if a facility recognizes
that the prevention of a BP-type disaster will pay even more. Other organizations use this
same technique of self-compliance and goal-setting as a means of rendering safe
inherently dangerous procedures. These comparisons suitably fit the mitigation of
explosives-related threats in that the consequences, as stated earlier in the risk
management models, are worth an authentic training mechanism that implements a
change in human behavior and attitude.
3.2.2. International Cyanide Management Code. In keeping with the
environmental theme, there are other organizations that rely on self-regulation. Like ISO
14001, the International Cyanide Management Institute (ICMI) outlines a voluntary
program that maintains the safe manufacturing, transportation and use of cyanide for gold
producers. Cyanide is a vital chemical used in the extraction of gold ore. The institute
acknowledges the necessity of the chemical, like the necessity of explosives consumption
in the U.S., and provides guidelines for users of the deadly chemical to improve the
safety and health of workers and the environment. Again, the purpose of this comparison
is to note consistencies and benefits in programs where there is a concentration of selfregulation with the consideration that a significant event can be devastating for the
company. By drawing these comparisons, it is the intent of the author to bring to light
that a facility can incorporate in its own SOP the same approach at a relatively low cost.
This also makes a determination that if the facility fails to implement sensible ERA along
with other countermeasures, the catastrophic outcome may be insurmountable.
The ICMI code is strikingly similar to the ISO 14001 standard. It urges
participants to be “audited by an independent third party to determine the status of Code
[sic] implementation. Those operations that meet the Code [sic] requirements can be
certified. A unique trademark symbol can then be utilized by the certified operation.
Audit results are made public to inform stakeholders of the status of cyanide management
practices at the certified operation” (International Cyanide Management Institute, 2010).
As with the ISO 14001 standard, this composition will not investigate fully the intricate
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details of the code or any other standard, but will emphasize to facility managers the
advantages of a similar approach. Obviously, there are the quantifiable benefits as well.
In a 2009 report, the ICMI code was evaluated by Dawn Garcia of SRK
Consulting, who noted that “Benefits include lower risk operations, easier financial
funding, and better community relations” (Garcia, 2009). Like the ISO 14001, it is
commonly recognized that this level of transparency produces measureable advantages.
However, to participate in the cyanide code, signatories must pay fees. Cyanide
producers and users must conduct a cost-benefit analysis to justify participation in the
program. Unlike BP, where billions of dollars barely dent the annual profit, this risk
management technique must be put in the perspective of environmental damage or danger
to human life; quite obviously the same focus for explosives attacks or incidences.
In 2009, an overflow from a solution pond containing sodium cyanide caused
environmental and biological damage near a Ghana-based gold mine. In early 2010, the
Environmental News Agency reported that the Newmont Mining would pay $5 million in
compensation (Environmental News Agency, 2010). While there were no human deaths
at Ahafo gold mine, the blemish on Newmont‟s reputation and perhaps the perception of
the industry as a whole most likely will hurt worse than the slight cut from Newmont‟s
more than a half a billion dollars first quarter earnings. This goes for BP and the oil
industry as well. Coincidently, Newmont Mining Corporation is an ICMI code signatory
receiving its Ahafo certification more than a year prior to the spill (Golder Associates Pty
Ltd, 2008). According to the company, it was a technological failure, a malfunction in
pond-level instrumentation, which led to the spill.
But what happens when a company has everything to lose? When compared to the
loss of life and infrastructure from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, dead fish and
plants have little clout. As stated in Section 1, a facility must maintain a diligent stance
on site protection and utilize all reasonable means to protect its interests. When telecasted
images of the bodies of small children, courageous first responders and other innocent
civilians reach every American home, the dust will barely settle before investigations are
launched and methods are questioned. There is a simple, low-cost approach to combat
these devastating effects. And while owners and operators cannot guarantee the
protection of all CIKRs, they can effectively harden the target to deterrence, and within a
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reasonable budget, make ERA training applicable to their facility. This training must
focus on altering the mindset of facility managers and first responders. It must allow
flexibility in SOP development and empower security personnel to create realistic risk
management models. Most importantly, ERA training must provide a clear foundation of
recognizing explosives components and an understanding of the catastrophic effects of
blasts.
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4. EXPLOSIVES RECOGNITION AND AWARENESS TRAINING

Sparked by a combination of ideas, offering low-cost, comprehensive ERA
training to law enforcement was the culmination of two experiences by the author. After
discussing several events in which local law enforcement was exposed to potentially
deadly explosives threats, an offer was made to organize and provide no-cost ERA
training for police officers in the Rolla, Missouri area. Additionally, with the introduction
of a new program at Missouri S&T, a Master of Science in Explosives Engineering, an
effort was also undertaken to provide professional development to interested officers and
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the United States Army Engineer School
(USAES) located at Fort Leonard Wood (FLW), Missouri. These two endeavors are the
origination of the methodology used to develop and communicate the need for ERA for
first responders and military professionals who typically take roles in explosives-related
threat response, mitigation or policy. This training is a fundamental contributor to
eliminate complacency, develop the understanding of explosives threats through
advanced education and create awareness of explosives that has normally eluded
technological researchers.
In the fall of 2010, this researcher participated in an event sponsored by
Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts, the home of the DHS COE for
explosives-related threats, dubbed the Research and Industrial Collaboration Conference
(RICC). The annual event is geared to bring together those in industry and academia to
establish a better transition of technologies, most used in explosives detection, from
college and national labs to the personnel in the field. Again, while this is a noble effort,
the discouraging discovery made by this author is that most of the researchers have never
witnessed a high-explosive detonation nor did they understand the concept of adequate
standoff. A suicide bomber is capable of carrying explosives to cause death at hundreds
of meters; explosives detection technology presented at the RICC touted standoff
distances 50 meters or less. These researchers, like law enforcement, are in need of
pertinent ERA training as to better develop the technology used by security professionals.
With the cooperation of Dr. Jason Baird, an explosives expert from Missouri
S&T, ERA training at Missouri S&T was first introduced in the fall of 2009. Initially,
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members of the Phelps County Sheriff‟s Department participated. The goal was to
introduce basic knowledge of explosives and explosives devices to first responders
operating in close proximity to the storage and usage of explosives. The topics include
explosives regulations and guidelines, safety and handling, demonstrations of high and
low explosives, initiators and initiation systems, special detonators, and hazards
associated with explosives.
The ERA training quickly gained the interest of other departments and within the
next year 30 officers participated from not only the sheriff‟s office, but also Rolla Police
Department, Rolla Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Missouri S&T Police
(University Police), reserve training officers and two special agents from the FBI. There
are ongoing efforts to bring agents from the ATF and employees from the Missouri State
Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) as well as private industry professionals.
A survey was created in order to tailor the ongoing training to fit the needs of the
participants. An example of the survey is shown in Appendix D. Survey analysis and
results are discussed in the subsequent text in this section.
Each ERA participant was asked to complete a survey that required five
quantitative responses and three qualitative answers. For the quantitative responses, a
range from one to five was used to score the familiarity and interest of the participant,
and the significance and effectiveness of the training. The applicability rating, ranging
from one to five, is as follows:
1-not at all, 2-slightly, 3-somewhat, 4-very, 5-extremely.
For instance, if an officer is asked how familiar she is with explosives, circling the
numeral one would indicate no familiarity and five would indicate expert familiarity. The
following by-question analysis gives insight as to the pertinence of ERA to law
enforcement officers who completed the survey.
Question 1: How effective was this training in reinforcing your knowledge of
explosives?
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Out of 29 responses the mean answer was 4.55. This indicates that training
provided was between “very” and “extremely” effective. This shows that officers
felt more educated and informed about explosives after completing the training.
This awareness equates to a psychological advantage when responding to an
explosives-related threat especially to those operating within close proximity to
explosives storage and transportation
Question 2: How effective was the instructor(s) at presenting the material?
All participants with the exception of two indicated that the instructors were
extremely effective in conveying the training topics. The average was 4.93, which
shows that the trainers at Missouri S&T utilized proven teaching techniques and
generated sufficient interest through demonstrations, discussion and visual aids.
Current information, such as recent failed IED attempts within the U.S., was used
to reinforce learning and make it applicable to the profession.
Question 3: At your present level, how significant are explosives-related
threats?
Two-thirds of the participants scored a four or five, indicating that they believed
within their current role, they will encounter an IED. The response average was a
3.93, showing that most respondents felt that there is a “very” significant threat of
an explosives event occurring within their community. A reality confirmed by
Question 8. Only one participant indicated a score lower than three.
Question 4: How interested are you in participating in more advanced
explosives training?
The mean for interest in future training was 4.28. These results indicate that future
advanced ERA training would be of significant interest to most trainees. One
participant answered that there was no interest in more advanced explosives
training.
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Question 5: Prior to taking this training, how familiar were you with
explosives and explosives-related threats?
Out of 29 responses, nearly all were scored a three or less. The average familiarity
score was 2.1, indicating that this training increased the ERA for most of the
attendees as this was their first significant explosives training session in which
they felt more aware of the potential threats. Couple this with the results of
Question 1, there is no doubt that emergency response professionals need and
welcome the training.
The survey‟s three quantitative questions 6-8 were collected and categorized into
major responses. This portion of the survey acts as a written AAR in which participants
can provide written feedback to improve the training for the next group. Also addressed
is the exposure of trainees to explosives-related threats.
Question 6: What are your recommendations for improving this course?
Figure 4.1 shows the results.

Suggested Improvements to ERA
Training
28%

27%

IED Identification
More Explosives
More Advanced

14%
21%

Nothing
No Comment

10%

Figure 4.1. Suggested improvements to ERA training
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Among the most popular suggestions for improving the training was the addition
of more IED identification. Approximately the same number of respondents offered no
comment to the question, or leaving the answer blank. If this answer is assumed to mean
that officers have no suggestions and were satisfied with the course, then this answer
could be married with the group who responded that nothing should be changed. If this is
the case, then half of the trainees were completely content with the basic intent of the
ERA training. The need for more IED training has been addressed by instructors and IED
training simulators, smart cards and references have been added. However, this material
has yet to be used in a training session.
In keeping with an authentic AAR, officers were also asked to provide feedback
over what they felt should be kept in the training.
Question 7: What did you like most about the training? Figure 4.2 shows the
results.

Recommended Sustains to ERA
Training
3%
Demonstrations
21%

Good Basic Info
41%

4%

Everything
No Comment
Relevance

31%

Figure 4.2. Recommended sustains to ERA training

Overwhelmingly, those participating in the training expressed that the explosives
demonstrations were the most critical part of the course. Nearly one-third answered that
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they felt the training provided a good foundation of explosives knowledge. Out of the 29
respondents, 21-percent offered no answer. Like Question 6, an officer offering no
response either had no pertinent feedback or believed the training was adequate.
The final question of the ERA survey addresses the applicability of the training to
those serving in a law enforcement capacity. The question was used to determine how
often, if at all, local officials were faced with a genuine explosives-related threat.
Question 8: During your career, have you ever experienced an explosives
threat on the job? Explain.
Out of 25 responses, 16 revealed that they have indeed come into contact with
explosives devices or have been called to an explosives-related threat, the majority being
bomb threats. That is 64-percent of first responders who have experienced a significant
threat. Marry that number with the absence of previous explosives training and the
conclusion is a grim reminder that after so many explosives attacks and threats, the
nation‟s initial response personnel are still not equipped with the knowledge they need to
protect the community and themselves. What‟s more, once discussing particular cases, it
was revealed that oftentimes inexperienced officers would carelessly handle and store
explosive devices and even transport the “bomb” in the same vehicle as passengers.
There were other significant discoveries as well.
During informal discussions with trainees, another important observation was
made. Several local officers were unaware of the amount of explosives stored on or near
campus and many did not know if the university‟s explosives storage was part of the
local emergency response plan. This pertains to law enforcement officials‟ perception
that they will likely face an explosives-related threat. Even more staggering is the thought
that firefighters may also be ignorant of the aforementioned observation. Like a police
officer pursuing the source of gun fire, an active shooter, firefighters are trained to
extinguish fire. But if these brave souls are unaware of the fact that the fire they are
attempting to extinguish is in close proximity to explosives storage, the catastrophic
result is many lives lost and many more rescuers subjected to the same fate. This has
happened before.
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In November 1988, Kansas City, Missouri firefighters responded to an early
morning arson fire on a construction site. The construction company was using a blasting
agent comprised of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, commonly known as ANFO.
Although initial emergency response calls indicated that explosives were on site and
possibly ablaze, the exact location of the magazines containing the explosives was not
known. Firefighters were also unaware of improper storage prior to the response; which
included unacceptable safe distances to nearby structures and thoroughfares and between
the two magazines that exploded. When firefighters arrived on scene to battle the blaze,
two explosions consisting of tens of thousands of pounds of ANFO and dynamite claimed
the lives of all six responders. In a subsequent report by the United States Fire
Administration, investigator Jack Yates concluded that if the seasoned firefighters had
known the exact location of the explosives and the magazines were marked, this tragedy
perhaps could have been avoided (Yates, 1989). Although there were no marking
requirements for the magazines themselves, and considering the fire would have
destroyed the placard anyway, just by having the fire department visit the site and discuss
the company‟s emergency response plan involving explosives would have led to greater
communication, a fundamental for ERA.
As discussed in Section 5, ERA is a basic component of a more elaborate site
security model that includes all relevant responders. The ERA instructors in this
particular instance encouraged law enforcement to become better familiar with
emergency management directors and the local emergency management plan. With ERA
training, first responders can be better prepared psychologically for appropriately dealing
with such instances.
There is a current effort to expand ERA training to other pertinent agencies.
Besides law enforcement, fire departments and other emergency relief workers would
benefit from such training. The goal is to provide an explosives education to those who
may be exposed to such threats. ATF offices and the Missouri State Emergency
Management Agency (SEMA) have expressed interest in taking part in the ERA classes.
There has also been expressed interest by private security consultants as well. To date, no
courses have been scheduled for these entities. However, great strides have been taken to
make the advanced explosives education available to the U.S. military.
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Also a part of the ERA training was providing Officer Professional Development
(OPD) to components of the USAES at FLW. This initial effort was the development of a
previously unidentified focus group for the DHS ALERT education initiative. However,
the briefings spawned a storm of interest in the recently approved Explosives Engineering
Master of Science degree from Missouri S&T.
The first session was conducted with approximately 50 officers and NCOs with
the 1st Engineer Brigade. Traditional combat engineers are tasked with explosives
demolition, breaching and providing explosives clearance services to supported units.
The ERA training consisted much of what was offered at the university as well as
presenting ideas of explosives implementation and explosives products. The intent was to
establish advanced explosives education to future retirees who would potentially pursue
employment with the federal government. As mentioned in previous sections, there are
few colleges in the world that can provide this training at an advanced level. In its
original capacity, ALERT was designed to recruit such professionals in order to enhance
the nation‟s pool of explosives professionals. While the goal was to incorporate the intent
with high school and college students, this researcher organized the military effort to
establish a more cooperative explosives education relationship with the USAES. The
initial training was attended by commanders at all levels of the brigade and, while there
are no official surveys or reviews, received tremendous positive feedback which inspired
an OPD with the USAES commandant Brigadier General Bryan Watson. General Watson
provided an additional 20 soldiers to attend the same training which resulted in
astonishing interest in the explosives engineering program. These participants were
oblivious to most of the resources and capabilities of the department, although located
less than 30 miles away. There are ongoing efforts to provide a degree track for soldiers
interested in the explosives engineering program and it is anticipated that the original
intent of the ALERT initiative will be met.
The next step of ERA is to incorporate the training into a genuine site security
plan. Although site security personnel have not attended the ERA training discussed in
this document, it is vital that those tasked with guarding infrastructure undertake a role in
ERA training. This plan is detailed further in the following section.
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5. SITE AWARENESS OF FIRING AND EXPLOSIVES DEVICES

Facilities must have the means of routinely verifying their site protection plan. A
location, upon its own risk management process, can develop a tactical pilot and then
spot check its progress by conducting realistic and applicable exercises. These exercises
must be periodic and practical and include a proper evaluation or, as in the military, an
AAR. The AAR is used to identify sustains and desired improvements to the training
without targeting individual participants. It clearly defines the goal and details the
process of execution to determine if pre-exercise goals were met. The AAR includes all
participants. Without vital participant feedback, the facility may not meet the continuous
improvement requirement as outlined in Section 3.
This program suggests the implementation of human factor solutions to combat
bunker mentality and complacency. To alleviate concerns with organizational
complacency, employees involved with a task must be routinely challenged. Each month,
this author, armed with a uniform and military identification card, is enthusiastically
waved onto a Missouri military installation. The guard charged with recognizing threat
has become so removed from danger that the identification card is rarely checked. This
mentality exists because the guard is not tested and 9-11 has long passed.
When the consequences and threat potential, as discussed in Section 3, weigh
heavy on those charged with protection, then a climate of preservation will prevail, but
there also must be a focus on crisis management. There are several approaches to
motivate participants to remain vigilant in their task. During a 2005 tour supporting
Operation Iraqi Freedom, this author was part of a team tasked to train coalition forces in
combat operations. The first week in the area of operations, a complex ambush resulted in
the deaths of five Iraqi soldiers. Their vehicle, partially destroyed by an IED, was
splattered with the blood of the brave soldiers. As a constant reminder of the inherent
threat in combat, the Iraqi commander parked the truck near the entrance of the small
base. Everyone entering or exiting the base could see the truck and was continuously
reminded of the peril. While this is a drastic and grim example, this type of visual
reinforcement can be used in other industries. There is reinforcement through repetition
training as well.
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The military typically trains recruits through redundancy. Warriors are created
through constant exposure to repeated tasks, formally known as “battle drills.” The
purpose of a battle drill is to instill into a soldier an instinctive reaction under adverse
circumstances. This is the military approach to implant crisis management skills to the
lowest level employee thus ensuring mission success. This realistic trained response
incorporates critical thinking skills in order to preserve the mission and resources and
allows for soldiers to continue the mission regardless of location, leadership or other
influences and surprises. In his book On Killing, retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Dave
Grossman and former West Point psychology professor states that the military objective
during the American Civil War was to use “mind-numbingly repetitive drill” to “turn a
soldier into a small cog in a machine…ensuring the he would do his duty on the
battlefield” (Grossman, 1995). Grossman stresses that this psychological mechanism, a
significant emphasis in the military, is a product of recreating realistic conditions in
addition to the redundancy, and is a method used in other professions as well. He says the
technique is “used when training firemen and airline pilots to react to emergency
situations: precise replication of the stimulus that they will face (in a flame house or
flight simulator) and then extensive shaping of the desired response to that stimulus.
Stimulus-response, stimulus-response, stimulus-response. In the crisis, when these
individuals are scared out of their wits, they react properly and they save lives”
(Grossman, 1995). Perhaps the most notable example of this viewpoint is the emergency
aircraft landing in the Hudson River.
In January 2009, Captain Chesley Sullenberger, coincidently a former U.S. Air
Force pilot, conducted the emergency landing of a U.S. Airways passenger jet after
multiple bird strikes to the aircraft‟s engines. Following the landing, Sullenberger, whose
voice transmissions to both flight control and the passengers were remarkably calm
throughout the ordeal, only exited the plane after checking the cabin twice. The pilot
responsible for saving 155 lives that day later admitted in an interview that Grossman‟s
observations are with merit. The hero told interviewer Katie Couric “It was the worst
sickening, pit-of-your-stomach, falling-through-the-floor feeling I've ever felt in my life”
and credited a lifetime of education and training as the deciding factors (CBS News,
2009). The same methods of realistic, repetitive training that prepared Sullenberger must
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be included when directing site security operations. There also variety contained within
the mission.
To alleviate boredom, rotational work must be emplaced. An event must occur
and be unpredictable to test the security staff and emergency response personnel. Site
security personnel must be tested within the scope of their duties. Additionally, the
preferred method of sustainability is via positive reinforcement, such as in canine
training, rather than negative repercussions. To achieve complete site awareness of firing
and explosives devices (SAFE-D), an all-inclusive approach must be established. This
section provides a five-phase outline for a suggested program in which facility managers
can employ, but does not serve to address every aspect of concern specific to every
industry. This psychological training model begins with ERA in the “familiarization”
phase; incorporates knowledge and practical exercise in the “application” phase; develops
sensible SOPs with third-party review in the “validation” phase; conducts comprehensive
review during the “evaluation” phase; and finally utilizes the “retention” phase for
continuous focus on the protection plan. An easy acronym to recognize the tool: Facilities
must do themselves a “faver” [sic] by implementing SAFE-D. A comprehensive
decision-making matrix for SAFE-D implementation is included in Appendix E. The
SAFE-D cyclical model in shown in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1. The SAFE-D model
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Phase 1 focuses on obtaining ERA training for appropriate personnel. Depending
on the institution, the facility managers should also be familiar with the LERP, especially
for facilities storing explosives. As discussed in Section 4, local police officers were not
aware of the storage of explosives in their community nor could they recall the
emergency management director for the city or the LERP. To establish a legitimate risk
management plan and SOP, all of those involved in disaster response must come to the
table. The time to meet these officials is not when there is an explosives incident. Rather,
initial ERA training should include site security personnel and the local and state
agencies responsible for supporting the facility in the event of an explosives attack. In
keeping with the goals outlined in Section 1.2, providing ERA training to all of those
potential actors in a location in close proximity to the potential target allows
familiarization and networking functions to occur during the training. Officials can take
this time to exchange contact information, ideas and further critique the LERP as it
pertains to the facility. Much of this will naturally occur during informal discussions, but
the initial ERA training is not only to serve as a foundation for explosives and component
awareness, but also as a conduit for original thought and information sharing. The initial
training should be designed to put names to faces and identify who should respond to an
explosives-related threat in order to prevent crowding of onsite personnel. This point is
revisited in Phase 5.
Considering many emergency response personnel have little experience with
explosives, as seen in the surveys of the ERA training conducted at Missouri S&T, the
initial training should encompass basic explosives training lasting 16-24 hours.
Principles, like those listed in Section 4, should act as a transitional function. The training
must bring the threat to the participants by using realistic material to which the trainees
can relate. Baird‟s ERA session accomplished this goal. The explosives educator begins
the training event by showing video of international law enforcement improperly
handling IEDs. While graphic, the video serves to remind police officers of the
consequences carelessness can cause. Additionally, demonstrations of high explosives are
also used to fortify the point that just a small amount of explosives can have a major
impact in close proximity. By witnessing firsthand the power of a high explosive, officers
can put into perspective future training scenarios where proper standoff can be
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implemented. Initial ERA training should be annually reinforced with no less than an 8hour refresher course. This is discussed in Phase 4.
The next phase is the practical exercise portion of the SAFE-D program. It
encompasses all the training acquired by security professional and first responders and
brings together a realistic test of the effectiveness of the training. Each training scenario
must be followed by an immediate AAR to ensure timely feedback of the participants.
Security professionals and first responders can alternate hosting exercises, but each
training event should always occur within the professionals‟ operational scope and in the
location of the potential attack or incident. Training aids can consist of make shift IEDs
or suspicious components of explosives devices. Exercise participants must focus on
applicable explosives counter measures and effective response. The key is to prevent the
detonation, and not to necessarily respond to a blast. Drawing again on the military, these
exercises can be community based and phased into a crawl, walk, run application;
meaning that a briefing on the exercise should be orally delivered to actors and an onsite
walk-through should occur prior to a live exercise. This is when the ERA training should
be incorporated into site security and SOPs originate. The exercise pilot should be a
standard event which pertains to the facility. More elaborate schemes can be devised
from the AARs and SOP revisions occurring in the evaluation phase.
In the third phase, managers will use lessons learned from the exercise and
incorporate improvements and seek additional resources. The SOP will be continuously
refined as threats vary, but this should be the main effort in developing a facility‟s
original, and most complete, SOP. The most critical aspect of SOP guidelines is
communicating the standard and distributing to all levels the owner‟s intent as it pertains
to combating explosives-related threats. While common sense is a great tool for onsite
security professionals to mitigate their own risk, managers should seek additional lowcost resources. These can come in the form of academic expertise, industry partner
review and governmental input that validates the organization‟s efforts. During this
phase, the facility should attempt to deliver a final product that addresses fully the risk
management process and hazards identified as well as any special criteria that each
location must consider. For example, for a plant located in close proximity of school,
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additional criteria would include school hours and traffic. Once these guidelines have
been reviewed appropriately, it is time to test the full product.
Phase 4 is a training evaluation. Site operators will use the refined SOP, current
threat and updated intelligence, and pending a third party audit, to retrain as necessary.
This is the time to develop a routine method of testing security plans and personnel. The
testing must develop several criteria in order to be successful, it must:
Be unpredictable and unannounced
Test within the scope of the training
Assign no personal blame for security flaws
Be measurable
Ensure feedback is timely
Allow for variance
Be incentive based
In the military, many of these approaches are undertaken in evaluating battle
drills. Once a platoon or squad has rehearsed continuously the applicable drill, variations
are added to enhance the crisis management potential of the soldiers. One of the favorite
approaches for first line supervisors is to remove the traditional leader from the training
and evaluate the remaining troops‟ ability to continue the flow of the mission with
minimal interruption. In just one battle drill, a leader can evaluate all of the criteria
mentioned above and follow up the training with an AAR that addresses pertinent
successes and shortcomings and assigns those to the method and not the individual
soldier. Incentives in the military often come in the form of general competiveness and
satisfaction of being a well-trained, ready-for-combat unit. Soldiers respond to training
evaluation the same as winning a football game. Except the triumph in battle certainly
has greater weight. This approach again allows for each facility to develop its own
standard, but there are simple approaches to consider.
The military uses “spot checks” to ensure soldier readiness. This is a sporadic
check of equipment or knowledge that is assumed to be readily available. However, the
scope guarantees a soldier will not be tested on something he is not expected to know.
The psychological effect of having a leader randomly perform this function keeps the
soldier aware. Site security personnel must undergo the same scrutiny, however, like the
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soldier, should not be tested on something outside of ERA or the scope of the site
security training. Once these tests take place, the site‟s security teams will develop the
same “esprit de corps” as a platoon and challenge each other to be diligent for nothing
more than bragging rights. The feeling of success gained by these teams will pay
extraordinary dividends and challenge others to excel. In contrast, the identification of
defects must not be personal. One security guard missing a simulated IED does not
constitute a failure in the entire system or a lack of concern from that individual. The
collective process should be addressed and not the blame game. Incentives can also be
used.
Perhaps the most significant, driving force in a time of peace is money. However,
in a time of war, preservation of life and property become more prevalent. Like investing
in risk management, a company is best served investing in the prevention of injury rather
than the compensation to hurt employees. The same applies to SAFE-D. Even small nonmonetary bonuses, for instance a pool of company merchandise or a company certificate,
convey the pertinence of the program. Having time off will work as well. Another
approach in the Army is to reward attentiveness. For example, a unit‟s maintenance
program may test individuals by purposely creating mechanical flaws on a vehicle.
Soldiers identifying and correcting all of the flaws may be permitted to leave work early
or may simply be recognized in the presence of their peers and leaders. This is effective
and contagious, as long as the soldiers are astute to the procedure and tested within the
scope of their ability. Like previously discussed scenarios, incentives, along with the
other criteria, should be based on the company‟s needs and project a continuing
investment in site security from explosives-related threats. A well-trained security force
is comparable to any detection measure a facility can purchase.
The fifth phase is the retention phase. Tests and scenario-based exercises will
continue as deemed necessary. Local law enforcement must participate in the training as
a means of total understanding of explosives-related threats. As well, this should include
other pertinent emergency response possessing a genuine role in the training. As seen
with Eric Rudolph, the Atlanta bomber during the 1996 Olympics, an actual explosive
event may just be a method of gathering more targets for a more intense detonation.
Agencies can alternate training responsibility and take turns hosting significant training
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events. During this phase, ERA refresher courses are given and daily intelligence is
addressed in risk management. Anytime a pertinent change in physical or operational
structure occurs within the facility, the SOP must be revisited and altered plans must be
conveyed again to all members who hold a stake in the site‟s protection. As discussed
Section 3.2, this is a time for review and improvement, just as the environmental
management system implies. These adjustments could be additions or alterations to the
plan, such as investing more money into equipment or canines. As well, it is a time to
inform the surrounding community that significant safeguards are in place to protect the
infrastructure and the population.
As mentioned, the SAFE-D program, although strictly based on explosivesrelated threats, is not intended to cure entirely a facility‟s security woes. Like the Army‟s
approach to risk management, it is indeed designed to teach security professionals “how
to think” and not “what to think.” Elaborate detection systems are designed to present
possible risks as a computer may interpret the threat. This method takes away the initial
gut instinct and critical thinking process the human factor brings to the table. SAFE-D is
also not a substitution for standoff barriers and detection systems. Rather, it is designed to
be coupled with existing technologies and protective measures. It gives a facility the
opportunity to design low-cost, sensible solutions to what consultants may claim is a
complex problem. Complacency is an ongoing problem for site managers. SAFE-D is a
constant reminder to first responders and security forces that the danger is real and
unpredictable.
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6. CONCLUSIONS

The United States obviously has a legitimate policy in place to deter and detect
explosives-related threats. Each year, massive spending is allocated to provide the force
with the most sophisticated sensor equipment and barriers. However, absent from the
well-intentioned strategy is a cost-effective training program that focuses on explosives
recognition and awareness and not just the technological aspect of detection and
protection. This psychological shortcoming, albeit a simplistic one, has created a
substantial effort to invest hundreds of billions of dollars into systems without marrying
that bankroll with a common-sense approach to train security professionals on the basic
principles of explosives-related threats. SAFE-D can enable first responders and facility
managers to create and sustain their own policy; one of which is free of government
reliance and error.
Countless companies today offer consultancy services for those willing to pay for
a relatively sensible approach to IED detection. As part of these services, IED training
kits and lessons on standoff protection are included as necessary components of ERA.
SAFE-D, a comprehensive approach pertinent to any location grants the liberty for each
facility to assess its own risk and apply dynamic SOPs in a continuous manner; all the
while empowering the facility to develop low-cost solutions to site protection. These
third-party-review methods, as specifically outlined in the previous text, already exist in
other industry and can be appropriately adapted to fit the needs of the facility.
Additionally, better crosstalk between interested parties must be incorporated.
A company cannot rely solely on the federal establishment or a single
technological solution. Like the attempted Time‟s Square bombing in 2010, in which an
attentive police officer noticed a smoking device inside a vehicle, ERA must trickle down
to the lowest level, where those professionals are likely to come into contact with the
threat. By knowing just the fundamentals of explosives, that police officer will not only
be able to recognize the threat, but also would understand the potential of the blast and
the necessary evacuation area and can ultimately prevent devastating blast effects like
those in the 1988 explosion in Kansas City. By observing components of the explosive
device, that police officer may be able to make a determination as to whether the threat is

59
legitimate or a distracter for a secondary event. It makes little sense for an executive to
attend the training outside of an assessment perspective. Psychologically, security
professionals must know they are being equipped with not only the best gear, but also
updated knowledge.
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

The next logical rung for research progression would be to test SAFE-D at a
legitimate facility and expand ERA to a network of professionals with a shared interest in
explosives-related threat protection.
Any company, school or hospital, has a legitimate concern for site safety. To
move forward, the SAFE-D outline must be tested under a voluntary basis for the
applicable facility. Site security managers can take these principles and incorporate the
phase into the SSP, the risk management process and their own SOPs. Each facility can
task employees, who are already the experts on the hazards present in the work
environment, to produce a genuine plan that begins with ERA and validates under a
collective training exercise involving local and state officials. Further, SAFE-D can be a
supplementary program to a site‟s already functioning security plan. Operators can take
phases of the plan and adjust them to fit specific needs intrinsic to the site.
Perhaps the easiest aspect of this research to advance is the ERA training.
Creating a network, in which much of the leg work has already been started, to bring
explosives-related threat training from governmental entities and academia to not only
first responders, but significant security contractors tasked with protecting CIKR and the
nation‟s most valued resources, people, is an obligation. The training must be available to
school resource officers, law enforcement and security forces tasked with guarding
vulnerable patients. As seen in Russia, this training can prove invaluable in thwarting
future attacks.
Lastly, to expand fully the advantages of SAFE-D, it must be incorporated into
the LERP for each community. For example, for each facility concerned either with
housing significant numbers of employees or visitors, or those involved with CIKR, there
must be a development of SOPs that involves emergency response. SAFE-D allows for
all incident responders, whether manmade or natural, to come together in rehearsal rather
than waiting for the tragedy to transpire to establish vital communications and procedures
for a broad-response catastrophe.
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